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I. INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act's'
genesis lay in the belief that a state's codification of its rules on
the recognition of foreign2 money-judgments would increase the
likelihood that similar judgments rendered by that state would be
recognized abroad.3 The treatment of United States judgments in
the courts of foreign nations concerned the Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws because United States courts traditionally
accord far better treatment to foreign judgments than is accorded
United States judgments abroad.4 The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments, or recognition practice, has long posed
special problems because of the vast differences in the various legal systems rendering the judgments. The Uniform Act attempts
to resolve such problems as finality, jurisdiction, and due process,
1.
form

13 UNWORM LAWS ANN. 270 (1980) [hereinafter cited as the Act or Uni-

Act].

2. "Foreign" judgment, as used throughout this Note, refers to a judgment
rendered by the court of a foreign nation, i.e., not the United States.
3. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 417, Commissioners' Prefatory Note.

4. Golomb, Recognition of Foreign Money Judgments:A Goal-OrientedApproach, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 604, 607 (1969).
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while achieving a measure of uniform treatment for the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in United States

courts. This Note will first consider the confused state of common
law recognition practice in the United States. This Note will then
examine the Uniform Act in detail, with the discussion centering
on the case law decided under the Act. Finally, this Note concludes with some observations on the effectiveness of the Uniform
Act to date, and a recommendation that recognition practice become a part of the federal common law, based on the policies underlying the Uniform Act.
II.

HISTORY OF RECOGNITION PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES

In the celebrated case of Hilton v. Guyot,5 the United States
Supreme Court detailed the principles governing the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments. Mr. Justice Gray stated:
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad
before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon
regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of
the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to secure
an impartial administration of justice between the citizens of its
own country and those of other countries, and there is nothing to
show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any
other special reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not, in an action
brought in this country upon the judgment, be tried afresh, as on a
new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that
the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.7

5. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
6. Comity is the common law principle which governs the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. The Hilton court defined comity as:
neither a matter of absolute obligation,. . . nor of mere courtesy and good
will ....

But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its terri-

tory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having
due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights
of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). As the above definition suggests,
the comity doctrine states but does not explain the desired result. Reese, The
Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. Rnv. 783,
784 (1950). See also Golomb, supra note 4, at 613.
7. 159 U.S. at 202-03.
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Although this statement became the cornerstone of recognition
practice in the United States,8 the Hilton Court, under the facts
of that case, refused to accord conclusive effect to a judgment
rendered by a French court of competent jurisdiction against a
United States defendant. The Court decided as it did because
judgments of United States courts at that time were reviewable
upon the merits under French law.9 Because French courts would
not accord conclusive effect to United States judgments, the Supreme Court refused to grant conclusive effect to the French
judgment.
The "reciprocity rule" set forth in Hilton has been widely criticized.' 0 Critics point out that reciprocity penalizes individual litigants because of positions taken by foreign governments." Reciprocity, they say, disregards both the merits of the claims and
fairness to the parties. 2 The main argument advanced by those
who support reciprocity is that it encourages foreign courts to respect United States judgments. 3 A significant number of civil law
countries require proof of reciprocity before recognition will be
4
accorded.'

Although the Hilton decision appears to mandate reciprocity in
United States recognition practice, its holding is narrowly circumscribed. The Hilton rule is limited to in personam judgments in
which a defendant has a judgment entered against him in a for8. von Mehren & Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-Country Judgments in the United States, 6 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 45 (1974). See
also notes 79-109 infra and accompanying text.
9. 159 U.S. at 227.
10. See, e.g., Homburger, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Yorker Reflects on Uniform Acts, 18 Am. J. CoMP. L. 367, 390
(1970); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the Law of Foreign Judgments: A HistoricalCriticalAnalysis, 16 LA. L. Rnv. 465 (1965); Reese, The Status in this Country
of Judgments Rendered Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 783, 793 (1950); Comment,
The Reciprocity Rule and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 16 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 327 (1977).
11. von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and Suggested Approach, 81 HARv. L. Rav. 1601, 1661 (1968).
12. Cheatham & Maier, Private International Law and Its Sources, 22
VAND. L. REv. 27, 68 (1968).
13. Comment, supra note 10, at 345.
14. Kulzer, Recognition of Foreign Country Judgments in New York: The
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 1, 2
(1968).
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eign nation's court in favor of a citizen or resident plaintiff.15 In
16
Johnston v. Compagnie Generate Transatlantique,
however,
the New York Court of Appeals faced a factually similar situation
but declined to follow the Hilton rule. Judge Pound, writing for a
unanimous court, distinguished Hilton in the following manner:

It is argued with some force that questions of international relations and the comity of nations are to be determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; that there is no such thing as
comity of nations between the state of New York and the Republic
of France; and that the decision in Hilton v. Guyot is controlling as
a statement of the law. But the question is one of private rather
than public international law, of private right rather than public
relations, and our courts will recognize private rights acquired
under foreign
laws and the sufficiency of the evidence establishing
17

such rights.

By thus bifurcating public and private international law, and categorizing the right in question as private, the New York Court of
Appeals evaded the Hilton precedent. Johnston holds that state
conflicts of laws rules govern the recognition and enforcement of
foreign judgments, at least when private rights are involved.
Many states subsequently adopted the Johnston rule.18 Other
states have followed the Hilton rule, evidently feeling that the
Supreme Court has spoken on a foreign affairs issue, thus binding
both state and federal courts.19 The Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws2" adopts the Johnston rule, which is the prevailing view today.
The Supreme Court's holding in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins21 further complicates the question of what law governs the recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United States. Although Erie probably requires a federal court to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits when determining the
15. 159 U.S. 113, 227 (1895).
16. 242 N.Y. 381, 152 N.E. 121 (1926).
17. Id. at 386-87, 152 N.E. at 123.
18. Some offered the explanation that Hilton involved an appeal from a

lower federal court, and the Court never indicated that its reciprocity rule was
intended to be binding on state courts.
19. See generally Comment, Judgments Rendered Abroad - State Law or
Federal Law, 12 VILL. L. REv. 618 (1967).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment e (1971).

21. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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measure of respect to be accorded a foreign judgment,22 the issue
is not well settled. Accordingly, common law recognition practice
in the United States remains a quagmire both from the standpoint of legal theory and that of practical application.
III. THE UNIFORM Acr AD DEVELOPING CASE LAW
The widely divergent views on recognition practice in this
country, while troublesome, have not been the motivating force
behind codification of the rules relating to recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. The main concern of those favoring codification has not been unifying the substantive law now in
force in most of the states so much as attempting to insure recognition of that law on the part of foreign nations.2 3 Even where
decisions on point exist, courts in civil law countries, unfamiliar
with the common law principle of stare decisis, often fail to accept those decisions as adequate proof of reciprocity. 24 The uncertain status of Hilton has also hindered recognition by civil law
countries of United States judgments. It has been contended that
codification may alleviate these problems and secure better treatment for United States judgments abroad. This position is supported by reference to the British experience after enacting the
(British) Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of
1933.25

The Uniform Act was adopted by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1962,26 and, to date, is
in force in twelve states. 27 This Note will analyze each section of
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment e (1971).
But see Homburger, supra note 10, at 382-83.
23. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF NEW YORK, 15 ANN. REP'T A100 (1970).
24. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE, REP'T OF SPECIAL COMM. ON
UNIFORM RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT 151 (1958).

25.

13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 417, Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1980).

26.

NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE 242-45 (1962).
27. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.30.100-09.30.180 (1973); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
1713-1713.8 (West 1972); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-62-101 to -109 (Supp. 1978);

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 110-1301 to -1308 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 77, §§ 121129 (Smith-Hurd 1966); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. §§ 10-701 to -709
(1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 235, § 23A (West Supp. 1979); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. §§ 691.1151-.1159 (1968); N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 710-718 (West 1979-80); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 24.200-.255 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 6.40.010-.915 (Supp. 1978).
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the Act and the pertinent case law decided under that section.
State legislature modifications of the language of the Act will be
discussed in connection with each affected section of the Act.
A.

Scope of the Act

Section I defines two important terms, "foreign state" and
"foreign judgment,"28 and delineates the scope of the Uniform
Act. Subsection (1) excludes from the Act's coverage all judgments rendered in the United States and its territories and possessions. These judgments fall under the full faith and credit
clause of the Constitution, 9 which is inapplicable to judgments
rendered by foreign nations.30 Although the full faith and credit
accorded sister state judgments is unavailable to foreign judgments, there is an inevitable carry-over of concepts into the area
of recognition practice.3 1 Much of United States recognition practice to date has been the somewhat careless application of domestic principles to foreign judgments seeking recognition and enforcement in this country. Some of the policies served by the full
3 2
faith and credit clause may be applicable to foreign judgments.
Each policy basis for the full faith and credit doctrine should be
analyzed as to its relevance in the foreign judgment context, and
so long as that policy is relevant, the concept should be carried
over. For example, one of the policies served by the full faith and
credit doctrine is res judicata. Any foreign judgment which meets
28. Section 1 provides that:
As used in this Act:
(1)"foreign state" means any governmental unit other than the
United States, or any state, district, commonwealth, territory, insular possession of, or the Panama Canal Zone, the Trust Territory of
the Pacific Islands, or the Ryuku Islands;
(2)"foreign judgment" means any judgment of a foreign state granting or denying recovery of a sum of money, other than a judgment
for taxes, a fine or other penalty, or a judgment for support in matrimonial or family matters.

29. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, as implemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
30. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912).
31. Several commentators argue that the differences in policy underlying interstate practice and recognition practice underscore the need for separate treatment of the two areas. Smit, InternationalRes Judicataand CollateralEstoppel in the United States, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 44, 46 (1962); von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 11, at 1605-07.
32. H. STEINER & D. VAGTS, TRANSNATIoNAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 777 (2d ed.
1976).
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all requirements for recognition under section 4 of the Uniform
Act should be entitled to the benefits of an end to litigation policy.3 3 Certainty and predictability are other values furthered by
the full faith and credit clause and these policies clearly apply to
the area of recognition practice. A third policy underlying the full
faith and credit doctrine is the need for uniformity within our
federal system. The needs of federalism clearly have relevance
only within the domestic context, and therefore rules based on
this policy should not be applied in the area of recognition
practice.
Subsection (2) limits the meaning of judgment by excluding
certain categories of judgments from the ambit of the Act. The
exclusions of judgments for taxes and fines or penalties follows
international recognition practice.3 The differences in national
laws concerning marital and support decrees necessitate the support judgment exclusion. 5 Although subsection (2) excludes these
categories from the Uniform Act, this in no way prohibits a state
from adopting a more lenient preclusive policy than that required
by the Act."' An adopting state is free, for example, to recognize
and enforce a foreign alimony decree.3 7 The Act merely prescribes
the minimum effect to which a qualifying judgment is entitled.3 8
Although section 1 seems to lay out the scope of the Uniform
Act in fairly simple terms, this provision has proved difficult to
apply in practice. The difficulty probably stems from common usage of the term "foreign judgment" to refer both to a judgment
rendered by a foreign nation and to one rendered by a sister
state. The overlap of full faith and credit concepts into the area
of recognition practice further adds to the confusion. 9 This confusion over terminology presumably explains the defendant's argument in Mueller v. Payn.0 In Mueller, plaintiff obtained a
judgment in Missouri and then sought full faith and credit in Ma-

33. But see Smit, supra note 31, at 62-68.
34. Kulzer, supra note 14, at 12.

35. Id. at 13.
36. Section 7 of the Uniform Act permits recognition of foreign judgments in
situations not covered by the Act.
37. Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978),
aff'd 285 Md. 173, 401 A.2d 479 (1979).
38. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF N w YORK, supra note 23, at A99.
39. See note 31 supra.
40. 30 Md. App. 377, 352 A.2d 895 (Ct. Spec. App. 1976). See also Collins v.
Peacock, 147 Ga. App. 424, 249 S.E.2d 142 (Ct. App. 1978).
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ryland. Defendant argued that plaintiff was not entitled to full
faith and credit because the rendering foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum 4 ' within the meaning of the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act.4 2 In affirming judgment for plaintiff, the court informed defendant that the Act had
no bearing whatsoever on the case and referred defendant to the
Act's definition of "foreign judgment.

4

3

A similar result obtained

in the Oklahoma case of Willhite v. Willhite.44 In Wilihite, a divorce decree requiring child support payments was rendered in
Texas. The decree was subsequently registered in Oklahoma pursuant to the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act, 45
which deals with the procedure for granting full faith and credit
to sister state judgments. Plaintiff garnished defendant's wages to
satisfy the judgment, .and defendant countered that the
Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction to enforce the Texas decree
because the Uniform Act specifically precludes recognition of
judgments for support in family matters.46 Once again the court
rejected defendant's misplaced argument, this time pointing out
the need to distinguish the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act from the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.47
The confusion engendered by the multiple meanings of "foreign
judgment" and the similarity in name of the two Uniform Acts on
Judgments also arises in Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph
Co. v. Woodstock, Inc.4s In this case, defendant argued against
the enforcement of a Florida judgment in Illinois by contending
that section 4(b)(6) of the Uniform Act applied. 49 Section 4(b)(6)
provides a discretionary ground for nonrecognition of a foreign
judgment for situations in which jurisdiction is based only on personal service and the foreign court is a seriously inconvenient forum. Though the Illinois court properly rejected defendant's contention, because jurisdiction was based on the transaction of
41. Uniform Act § 4(b)(6).
42.

30 Md. App. at 384, 352 A.2d at 900.

43. Id.
44. 546 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1976).
45. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 176 (1980)(1964 Revised Act).
46. 546 P.2d at 614.

47. Id.
48. 34 Ill.
App. 3d 86, 339 N.E.2d 423 (1975).
49. Id. at 89, 339 N.E.2d at 426.
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business in Florida, 50 it failed to carry the analysis to its logical
conclusion by indicating the inapplicability of the Uniform Act to
this full faith and credit question. Such incomplete analysis only
creates more confusion and uncertainty concerning the proper
scope and application of the Act. In another case applying the
Uniform Act inappropriately, Stevens v. Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, a California court relied on section 6 of the Act
to authorize a post-judgment stay of execution pending appeal of
an Oklahoma judgment.5 1 While there is nothing improper from a
policy standpoint in authorizing a stay of execution pending appeal, the statutory authorization for that stay is, by its own terms,
restricted to judgments of foreign nations. Thus, the cases noted
above make it obvious that greater care must be taken to differentiate sister state judgments from foreign nation judgments and
the Uniform Enforcement Act from the Uniform Recognition Act.
Even when the Uniform Act is inapplicable because of a subsection (2) exclusion, the Act should be consulted by courts in
formulating common law decisions. This practice will produce
greater consistency in decisions under the Act and at common
law, especially when the policies underlying the Act and the common law are identical or complementary. The only caveat to this
approach is that the reason for exclusion from the Act must first
be ascertained, because if the exclusion was predicated on policy
differences between the Act and the excluded category of judgments, the Act should no longer serve as a guide. While not relying on the Act as the basis for its decision, the court in Pentz v.
Kuppinger,5 - looked to the provisions of the Uniform Act in determining the effect to accord a foreign alimony decree. The opinion may be criticized because it does not clearly articulate the
reasons for referring to the Act. Nevertheless, the court properly
applied the Uniform Act provision allowing nonrecognition because the cause of action on which the judgment was based was
contrary to the public policy of the state.53 Thus, the court
reached a decision under the common law analogous to that
which would have been obtained under the Act.54

50. Id.

51. Stevens v. Sup. Ct. of L.A. Cty., 28 Cal. App. 3d 1, 4, 104 Cal. Rptr. 369,
371 (Ct. App. 1972).
52. 31 Cal. App. 3d 590, 107 Cal. Rptr. 540 (Ct. App. 1973).
53. Uniform Act § 4(b)(3).
54. 31 Cal. App. 3d at 597, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 545.
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Another appropriate application of section 1 of the Uniform
Act appears in the Illinois case of Nardi v. Segal 5 The issue
presented in Nardi was whether the Illinois court had jurisdiction
to enforce an Israeli decree for child support payments.5 6 The
court found no common law governing matrimonial matters in Illinois, as divorce and family matters are governed solely by statute in that state. 57 Since the statute governing recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments in Illinois, the Uniform Act, excludes judgments for support, and since there is no common law
on which to fall back, the court correctly held that it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the decree.5 8 The Nardi court also pointed out
the fundamental distinction between recognition and enforcement
of foreign judgments. 9 A foreign judgment is recognized when a
court concludes that a certain matter has already been decided by
the judgment and therefore need not be litigated further. On the
other hand, a foreign judgment is enforced when a party is accorded the relief to which the judgment entitles him.6 0
B.

Application of the Act

Section 2 provides that "this Act applies to any foreign judgment that is final and conclusive and enforceable where rendered
even though an appeal therefrom is pending or it is subject to
appeal."'" Thus, the rendering forum's determination of finalty,
conclusiveness, and enforceability governs applicability of the
Act. A judgment deemed not final by the rendering forum, or one
no longer enforceable because of the rendering nation's statute of
limitations, for example, cannot be recognized or enforced in the
United States pursuant to the Uniform Act.6 2 This follows from
the notion that a judgment should not be entitled to greater ef55. 90 Ill.
App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (App. Ct. 1967); see notes 147-50
infra and accompanying text. But see Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d
413 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978), aff'd 285 Md. 173, 401 A.2d 479 (1979).
App. 2d at 434, 234 N.E.2d at 806.
56. 90 Ill.
57. Id. at 436-37, 234 N.E.2d at 807-08.
58. Id. at 438, 234 N.E.2d at 808. See also Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill.
App. 3d 849, 360 N.E.2d 386 (App. Ct. 1977).
59. 90 Ill.
App. 2d at 434-35, 234 N.E.2d at 807.
60. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 8, at 38.
61. Uniform Act § 2.
62. A Japanese court's determination that an arbitration award was not a
judgment precluded recognition and enforcement of the award under the Uniform Act. Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).

UNIFORM ACT
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fect abroad than at home. 3
Section 2, however, must be read in conjunction with section 6.
The latter empowers the recognizing court to stay the proceedings
if an appeal is pending or the judgement is subject to appeal. 4
"Subject to appeal" infers that the right of appeal exists in the
rendering forum and that time remains within which to exercise
that right. Timely exercise of the right of appeal has been strictly
construed. For example, in Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,6 1 defendant failed to seek judicial review of an
arbitral award within the allotted time period and judgment was
entered against him. That judgment was enforced by the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, which stated that, "(w)e must recognize
that the judgment itself is definite in amount, was conclusive and
enforceable in Curacao, and. . . is final to the extent that it specifies what Solitron is to pay." 6
C.

Recognition and Enforcement

Section 3 states that except as provided in section 4,87 "a foreign judgment meeting the requirements of section 2 is conclusive
between the parties to the extent that it grants or denies recovery
of a sum of money." ' The conclusive effect of a foreign judgment
extends only to the parties, and its enforcement is limited to the
granting or denying of a sum of money. Any other equitable relief
to which the judgment-holder is entitled is precluded under the
Act. 9 A foreign judgment is granted conclusive effect even though
reexamination of the merits in this country would lead to a different result. Recognition will not be withheld merely because the
choice of law process in the rendering forum applies a law at variance with that which would be applied under the recognizing fo70
rum's choice of law principles.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Kulzer, supra note 14, at 14.
Uniform Act § 6.
489 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied 416 U.S. 986 (1973).
Id. at 1323.

67. Section 4 provides both mandatory and discretionary grounds for nonrecognition of a foreign judgment.

68. Uniform Act § 3.
69. Section 7, however, allows courts to look beyond the Act to common law
principles of the recognizing forum which may permit the granting of equitable
relief.
70. Watts v. Swiss Bank Corp., 27 N.Y.2d 270, 265 N.E.2d 739, 744, 317
N.Y.S.2d 315 (Ct. App. 1970). But see von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11,
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Section 3 does not clearly indicate whether domestic res judicata rules are to be applied to foreign judgments. The Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws suggests that United States
courts normally apply foreign rules of res judicata provided that
the foreign rules are substantially the same as those of the United
States. 1 It is uncertain whether United States courts would grant
similar effect to foreign rules that differ from common law norms,
such as splitting of causes of action.7 2 The silence of the Uniform
Act as to these conflicts questions suggests that the drafters chose
to leave this area to development in the courts.7
Section 3 also establishes the procedure for' enforcement of foreign judgments. They are to be enforced in the same manner as
sister state judgments, which are entitled to full faith and
credit. 4 The Commissioners' Comment to this section states that
the method of enforcement will be that of the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act of 1948 in states which have enacted that Act.78 The Comment seems contrary to the spirit of
the Act, however, since the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign
Judgments Act of 1948 requires a summary judgment-type proceeding to obtain domestic judgment status for a sister state judgment, while the equivalent Act of 1964 provides for direct registration of sister state judgments. Direct registration of judgments
would seem to provide the most assurance to foreign nations that
their judgments will in fact be recognized in the United States.
Requiring a second proceeding, however summary, to obtain a domestic judgment that may then be recognized and enforced adds
new uncertainty that could influence foreign nations to deny
United States judgments recognition abroad. Nonetheless, both
at 1636-42, in which it is argued that application of a choice of law test would
ensure minimal fairness and protect legitimate interests of the recognizing
forum.
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98, Comment f (1971).
72. Id.
73. Kulzer, supra note 14, at 22-23. Several commentators argue that the
end-to-litigation rationale of domestic res judicata is inapplicable to the foreign
judgments context. They contend that a second lawsuit would not be a duplication of effort because of the potential for substantive and procedural differences
between the forums. Smit, supra note 31, at 62; von Mehren & Trautman, supra
note 11, at 1605-06.
74. Uniform Act § 3.
75. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 419, 420, Commissioners' Comment to § 3 (1980).
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California 6 and New York"" have amended the language of section 3 to specifically require an action on the judgment or comparable proceeding.78
D. Grounds for Nonrecognition
The principles that govern recognition practice in the United
States, as stated by Mr. Justice Gray in Hilton v. Guyot,7 9 have

been incorporated into section 4 of the Uniform Act. That section
reads as follows:
(a) A foreign judgment is not conclusive if
(1) the judgment was rendered under a system which does not
provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with the
requirements of due process of law;
(2) the foreign court did not have personal jurisdiction over
the defendant; or
(3) the foreign court did not have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
(b) A foreign judgment need not be recognized if
(1) the defendant in the proceedings in the foreign court did
not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend;
(2) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(3) the (cause of action) (claim for relief) on which the judgment is based is repugnant to the public policy of this state;
(4) the judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive
judgment;
(5) the proceeding in the foreign court was contrary to an
agreement between the parties under which the dispute in
question was to be settled otherwise than by proceedings in
that court; or
(6) in the case of jurisdiction based only on personal service,
the foreign court was a seriously inconvenient forum for the
trial of the action. 0
76. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1713.3 (West 1972).
77. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 5303 (McKinney 1978).78. For New York cases decided under its amended § 3 of the Uniform Act,
see Biel v. Boehm, 94 Misc. 2d 946, 406 N.Y.S.2d 231 (Sup. Ct. 1978) and
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 43 A.D.2d 109, 349 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1973).
79. See note 10 supra.
80. Uniform Act § 4.
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Both sections 4(a)(1) and (2) are constitutionally mandated, requiring observance of domestic due process concepts before recognition can be accorded a foreign judgment. This is not to say that
mere differences in procedural systems suffice as grounds for nonrecognition. On the contrary, only a serious showing of injustice
resulting from use of the differing procedures will be sufficient
grounds for nonrecognition. 1 Under the United States Constitution any failure to comply with minimum requirements of domestic due process, adequate notice, and opportunity to be heard,
compels nonrecognition of the foreign judgment. This is illustrated by the case of Julqn v. Larson,82 in which a Swiss default
judgment is denied recognition by a California court. The issue
was whether the Swiss court had acquired personal jurisdiction
over defendant, a United States citizen doing business in Switzerland.8 3 To be recognized and enforced, a foreign judgment must
be conclusive; to be conclusive, the foreign court must acquire jurisdiction over the defendant.8 If a foreign court lacks personal
jurisdiction over the defendant, section 4(a)(2) of the Uniform
Act prohibits recognition of the foreign judgment. In Julen process was served on defendant by the mailing of two letters,
neither of which clearly indicated the legal significance of the
documents enclosed.85 The documents themselves were written in
German, a language the defendant could not read.8 6 The court
determined that in order for notice to meet the requisite level of
informativeness, a defendant should be informed, in the language
of the jurisdiction in which he is served, that a specific legal action is pending against him at a particular time and place.87 Since
no such notice was provided, the Swiss court had no basis on
which to exercise personal jurisdiction over defendant, and recognition of the judgment was denied.8 8 Whenever a question arises
as to whether a foreign court has personal jurisdiction over a de81. 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 423, Commissioners' Comment (1980).
82. 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (Ct. App. 1972).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 327, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
85. Id., 101 Cal. Rptr. at 797.
86. Id., 101 Cal. Rptr. at 798.
87. Id. at 328, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 798. The conclusion of the court is supported
by the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters of Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361,
T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
88. 25 Cal. App. 3d 325, 330, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800.
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fendant, section 5 of the Uniform Act must also be consulted.
Section 5 lists the kind of contacts which are deemed adequate
for the acquisition of personal jurisdiction.
Section 4(a)(1) denies recognition to a foreign judgment rendered under procedure incompatible with due process. This section thus raises the question of the impact of Shaffer v. Heitner"
on foreign judgments seeking recognition and enforcement in this
country when jurisdiction in the rendering court was based on intangible property of the United States defendant within the foreign nation. Shaffer requires sufficient minimum contacts among
the parties, the litigation, and the forum when the nonresident's
property is unrelated to the underlying cause of action 0 The sufficient minimum contacts standard adopted by the Supreme
Court in Shaffer defies a generalized response to the question
posed, because in each case the relationship between the United
States defendant and the forum, and between the parties, the forum, and the litigation will govern the question of sufficient contacts to satisfy notions of fair play and substantial justice.9 1 The
crucial inquiry, therefore, is whether a relationship between the
forum, the parties, and the underlying cause of action can be established. When such a relationship is established, due process
will be satisfied.
Lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the foreign court is the
final mandatory ground for nonrecognition under the Uniform
Act. New York has moved this provision to section 4(b), thereby
making nonrecognition discretionary when subject matter jurisdiction is lacking.9 2 Maryland, on the other hand, has added another provision to the mandatory nonrecognition category. This
provision prohibits recognition of foreign judgments obtained by
fraud. 93
The first of the discretionary grounds for nonrecognition occurs
in the situation in which defendant fails to receive notice of the
89. 433 U.S. 186 (1976).
90. Id.
91. See generally Note, The Applicability of Shaffer to the Quasi-in-Rem
Attachment of Foreigners' Assets, 12 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 393 (1979); 11
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 159 (1978).
92. Professor Kulzer explains the shift by stating that New York regards
rules of subject matter jurisdiction as primarily matters of internal organization
of a nation's courts. Kulzer, supra note 14, at 29.
93. MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 10-704(a)(4) (1974).
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proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to defend.9 4 A lack of
adequate notice would defeat an assumption of personal jurisdiction by the foreign court, thus compelling nonrecognition under
section 4(a)(2). Therefore, section 4(b)(1) must be read to deny
recognition when the defendant actually received notice, but it
was so late that the defendant was physically unable to arrive at
the proceedings in time to defend. Any other interpretation of
section 4(b)(1) could raise due process problems under the
Constitution. 5
Nonrecognition is likewise permitted if the judgment was obtained by fraud. The determination of fraud is made by the recognizing forum under the Act. It is defaulted, however, whether a
United States court would permit the issue of fraud to be settled
conclusively by a foreign law which might be based upon concepts
of fairness and justice at variance with those prevailing in the
United States. 7
The next defense to recognition of foreign judgments listed by
the Act is the public policy defense. This ground for nonrecognition has been characterized as the most elastic and unpredictable
of the Act's defenses.9 s A judgment will not be recognized under
the Act unless the underlying cause of action on which the judgment is based is contrary to the public policy of the state.99 It is
difficult to hypothesize a situation which would fall into this category which would not also be controlled by the proscription of
section 4(a)(1), thus compelling nonrecognition of the foreign
judgment.
Another discretionary defense to recognition exists if the foreign judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment. 100 In this situation, the court must balance the equities and
at least one commentator feels the scales should be tipped towards recognition of the foreign judgment. The New York CPLR
Practice Commentaries state that a foreign judgment should not
94. Uniform Act § 4(b)(1).
95. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 5304, Practice Commentaries (McKinney
1978).
96. Uniform Act § 4(b)(2).
97. Reese, supra note 10, at 794.
98. Scoles & Aarnas, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Nation
Judgments: California, Oregon, and Washington, 57 ORE. L. REv. 377, 384
(1978).

99. Uniform Act § 4(b)(3).
100. Id. § 4(b)(4).
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be recognized under section 4(b)(4) only after some showing why
the United States judgment should have priority. 10 1
Recognition may be denied if the parties agreed to a means of
dispute settlement other than proceedings in the rendering fo0 3
rum. 102 This provision applies to both arbitration agreements
and forum selection clauses. 10 4 The Supreme Court recently endorsed choice of forum selection clauses between contracting parties."' 5 If parties agree on a choice of court clause, this would establish a basis for personal jurisdiction over a defendant who
sought to contest jurisdiction in a recognition proceeding.10 8
The last provision in section 4 adds a new twist to recognition
policy. 0 7 Section 4(b)(6) in effect grants a forum non conveniens
defense to recognition, but only if jurisdiction was based on personal service.' 08 This ground for nonrecognition qualifies section
5(a)(1) of the Act, which approves the transient rule of personal
0 9 Thus, section
jurisdiction as a sufficient jurisdictional basis."
4(b)(6) gives a defendant who is personally served a possible defense to the foreign court's jurisdiction.
Massachusetts and Georgia, however, have added another paragraph to this section of the Uniform Act. The Massachusetts provision, which is similar to the Georgia rule, provides that "A foreign judgment shall not" 0 be recognized if judgments of this state
are not recognized in the courts of the foreign state.""' The addition of this clause, of course, adds a reciprocity requirement" 2
which effectively undermines the very purpose of the Uniform

101.

N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 5304, Practice Commentaries (McKinney 1978).

102. Uniform Act § 4(b)(5).
103.

See New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade & Indus., Ltd., 65 Misc.

2d 653, 318 N.Y.S.2d 980, 985 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
104. Scoles & Aarnas, supra note 98, at 386.
105. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972).
106. Uniform Act § 5(a)(3). See also notes 124-31 infra and accompanying
text.
107. Kulzer, supra note 14, at 35.
108. See 13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 423, Commissioners' Comment to § 4
(1980).
109. Homburger, supra note 10, at 373.
110. By changing the introductory language of § 4(b) to "shall not be recognized" from "need not be recognized," Massachusetts and Georgia presumably
intend to make all the grounds for nonrecognition listed in § 4 mandatory.
111. MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 325, § 23A (West Supp. 1979).
112. The arguments against the reciprocity requirement have been discussed
previously. See notes 10-12 supra and accompanying text.
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Act. A major purpose of the Act was to codify recognition practice
in the United States so that other nations will treat United States
judgments favorably. As long as certain states reserve reciprocity,
however, foreign nations cannot reasonably predict the treatment
their judgments will receive. Thus, the reservation of reciprocity
may not only defeat the purpose of enacting the Uniform Act in
Massachusetts and Georgia, but also may harm other states' judgments abroad. There are no reported Massachusetts or Georgia
cases since Hilton that deny recognition of a foreign judgment
solely on lack of reciprocity grounds.1 13 Indeed, this author found
1 14
no Massachusetts cases decided under the Uniform Act at all.
This dearth of authority is not unusual, however. Several other
states which had adopted the Uniform Act have yet to decide any
cases under it."15 Furthermore, those states that have adopted the
Act have sometimes been inconsistent in applying it. For example, the Illinois courts have rendered several decisions based on
the Uniform Act"8' and have looked to the Act for supporting policy in other situations. 1 7 Nonetheless, in Hager v. Hager"" the
court considered the question of recognition of a foreign alimony
decree and, in listing grounds on which recognition could be withheld, included lack of reciprocity. 119 This is difficult to reconcile
since the Uniform Act had been in force in Illinois four years
when the Hager opinion was rendered, and Illinois has no additional provision reserving reciprocity. In addition, the court indicated its awareness of the Act by correctly holding that support
payments are expressly excluded from its scope.'2 0 The mixed references by the Hager court to both the Hilton reciprocity rule on
one hand and the Uniform Act on the other, indicate the confu113. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second Restatement of
Conflicts of Laws, 72 COLUM. L. REv. 220, 233-36 (1972).
114. The lack of case law could be explained because the cases annotated in
conjunction with the Massachusetts version of the Uniform Act all involved domestic judgments and full faith and credit issues. For a discussion of this frequent error, see text at 7-11.
115. No case law pertaining to the Uniform Act was found in Alaska, Colorado, Michigan, Oregon, or Washington.
116. See, e.g., Zalduendo v. Zalduendo, 45 Ill. App. 3d 849, 360 N.E.2d 386
(App. Ct. 1977); Nardi v. Segal, 90 Ill. App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (App. Ct.
1967).
117. Davis v. Nehf, 14 Ill. App. 3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (App. Ct. 1973).
118. 1 Ill. App. 3d 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (App. Ct. 1971).
119. Id. at 1051, 274 N.E.2d at 159.
120. Id. at 1052, 274 N.E.2d at 160.
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sion that lingers in the area of United States recognition practice,
even in those states that have enacted the Uniform Act.
E.

PersonalJurisdiction

Section 4(a)(2) provides that no recognition is due a foreign
judgment unless the rendering court acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Section 5 then lists jurisdictional bases
deemed adequate for the acquisition of personal jurisdiction. The
first adequate basis of personal jurisdiction under the Act is personal service in the foreign state, 121 even though this practice is
not accepted in many civil law countries. 122 As noted previously,
however, the forum non conveniens provision of section 4(b)(6),
modifies the transient rule of personal jurisdiction. Another valid
basis of personal jurisdiction under section 5 occurs when the defendant makes a voluntary appearance in the proceedings other
than a "special" appearance. 2 3 Agreement of the defendant prior
to commencement of proceedings to submit to the jurisdiction of
the foreign court constitutes a third basis of personal jurisdiction. 24 For instance, in New Central Jute Mills Co. v. City Trade
& Industries, Ltd., 2 5 defendant who had agreed contractually to
submit to arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Indian Arbitration Act, found itself precluded from challenging the jurisdiction of the Indian court. The court further held that any other
defenses sought to be raised by defendant must have been asserted in the Indian courts, since defendant agreed to proceed in
2
the India forum.
The contrary result was reached in Kough v. Bank of Montreal,2 7 however. Kough involved a breach of contract action by
the bank against defendant Kough, as guarantor of the loans of a
British Columbian corporation. The contract executed between
Kough and the bank stated that "the courts of that Province
(British Columbia) shall have jurisdiction over all disputes which
may arise under this contract.' ' 28 In analyzing this case, the court

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Uniform Act § 5(a)(1).
Homburger, supra note 10, at 373.
Uniform Act § 5(a)(2).
Id. § 5(a)(3).
65 Misc. 2d 653, 318 N.Y.S.2d 980, 985 (Sup. Ct. 1971).
Id.
430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Id. at 1247.

190

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 14:171

noted first, that a form contract was involved, and second, that a
clause specifically stating that Kough agreed to submit to the personal jurisdiction of the British Columbian courts could easily
have been added if the bank had intended. 129 The court further
characterized the above provision as "a general agreement that
the contract disputes would be governed by the law of British Columbia" as distinguished from the situation in New Central Jute,
where two large companies negotiated a contract providing for arbitration. 130 This distinction, and the result reached by the court,
is unpersuasive. Absent a large inequality in bargaining position 131 or an adhesion contract situation, there appears no reason
to avoid a finding of personal jurisdiction under section 5(a)(3) in
the Kough case.
The remaining three bases of personal jurisdiction under subsection (a) of section 5132 are more expansive grounds of long-arm
jurisdiction. Nonetheless, these bases are conservative when compared with expanding notions of jurisdiction in recent years 33 because these grounds result in a mandatory finding of personal jurisdiction under the Act. As the New York Judicial Conference
aptly noted, while it is common knowledge that "countries are
quite generous in extending their own jurisdictional reach, they
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Perhaps the court's reference to two large companies in New Central

Jute was meant to imply an inequality of bargaining position in the instant case.
This is unpersuasive because Kough, although a single individual, was a knowl-

edgeable businessman, and a member of the board of directors of the corporation whose obligations he agreed to guarantee.
132. These subsections are as follows:
(a) The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal jurisdiction if
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal
place of business, was incorporated, or had otherwise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state;
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the
proceedings in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim
for relief] arising out of business done by the defendant through the
office in the foreign state; or
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign
state and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for re-

lief] arising out of such operation.
13 UNIFORM LAws

ANN.

at 425.

133. von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 8, at 53.
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are reluctant to recognize very many extensions by others. '134
This understandably self-interested attitude makes determinations by a recognizing court of whether a rendering court had jurisdiction over the defendant one of the most difficult problems
impeding international cooperation in the field of recognition
practice. 135
Section 5(b) provides that courts may recognize other bases of
jurisdiction not specified in the Act. This provision allows the enacting state to recognize foreign judgments rendered on more expansive bases of jurisdiction.13 6 The court in Kough v. Bank of
Montreal,1 37 for example, had little difficulty going beyond the
provisions of section 5(a) to find a basis for personal jurisdiction
over defendant Kough. The court found several significant contacts between defendant and the British Columbian forum, such
as that defendant was engaged in business there (albeit without
an office); that he was a director and shareholder of a company
operating in British Columbia; and that he signed a contract in
British Columbia specifically relating to other dealings in the
province."3 8 The court emphasized that it would not have recognized the jurisdiction of the British Columbian courts had the
contacts between defendant and the province been less
13 9
pronounced.
In Siedler v. Jacobson,140 contracts between defendant and the
Austrian forum were found to be "so casual and incidental" by a
New York Court that it refused to recognize the Austrian court's
jurisdiction. Defendant in Siedler purchased an antique from
plaintiff in Vienna and subsequently refused payment, alleging
misrepresentation of the age and value of the piece."" Defendant
was personally served in New York, and a default judgment was
rendered against him in Austria, which plaintiff then sought to
enforce in New York pursuant to the Uniform Act.' 42 The court
stated:

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF NEw YORK, supra note 23, at A102 (1970).
Kulzer, supra note 14, at 38.
13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 425, Commissioners' Comment.
430 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
Id. at 1248.
Id. at 1249.
86 Misc. 2d 1010, 383 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
Id., 383 N.Y.S.2d 834.
Id.
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Analysis of the legislative history of Article 53 (the New York Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act) makes clear that
it was not within the intendment of that statute to adopt the broad
definition of "transacting any business" applicable under CPLR
§302 (New York's long-arm jurisdiction statute) as the criterion for
extending recognition to foreign country judgments themselves
bottomed upon correspondingly liberal bases of jurisdiction. 4 "
The Siedler court's position that jurisdictional standards for recognition purposes should not mirror the recognizing court's standards for assuming jurisdiction has many supporters."" The opposite view posits that it is appropriate for an enacting state to
recognize under section 5(b), any jurisdictional basis it recognizes
in its local law for a foreign judgment.'4 5 There should be no due
process problems associated with such a jurisdictional basis. The
debate over how far to expand jurisdictional bases for recognition
purposes must ultimately focus on the purpose of the Uniform
Act. Section 5 clearly does not mandate recognition in a Siedlertype situation, and there is substantial precedent for the Siedler
approach.14 6 But if the basic premise underlying the Uniform Act
is accepted - that consistent recognition of foreign judgments in
the United States will promote recognition of United States judgments abroad-then the Act may be used as a springboard to expand recognition of foreign judgments, consonant, of course, with
due process and fairness to the parties.
E.

Nonexclusivity of the Act

Section 7 of the Uniform Act provides that "this Act does not
prevent the recognition of a foreign judgment in situations not
covered by this Act.' 47 This section acknowledges the nonexclu143. Id.
144. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 11, at 1616-29.
145. N.Y. CrV. PRAC. LAW § 5305, Practice Commentaries (McKinney 1978).
146. See, e.g., Falcon Mfg. (Scarborough) Ltd. v. Ames, 53 Misc. 2d 332, 278
N.Y.S.2d 684 (Civ. Ct. N.Y. 1967).
147. The remaining provisions of the Uniform Act are as follows:
§ 8 [Uniformity of Interpretation]
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
§ 9 [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments
Recognition Act.
13 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. at 427.
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sive nature of the Uniform Act, and provides that an enacting
state may recognize a foreign judgment when not required to do
so by the terms of the Act. A clear illustration of this principle
was provided by the court in Wolff v. Wolff. 11 8 In this case the
court specifically held that the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act "neither provides for the recognition or
enforcement of the alimony provisions of the English divorce decree, nor precludes such recognition or enforcement on a basis
other than that set out in the Act. ' 149 The court then considered
whether recognition should be accorded under common law principles of comity 50 and concluded that the decree should be recognized and enforced. 51
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act was
not intended by its drafters to be new or controversial. It was
meant to be a codification of consistently applied common law
principles governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in the United States. The Special Committee on the
Uniform Act reported in 1958 that "in view of the obvious advantages of a Uniform Act, its adoption by the States, we think, is in
due course most likely." 52 The Committee's bold prediction has
not been realized, however, as less than one quarter of the states
to date have adopted the Act. 53 It is true that recognition questions rarely arise in many states, and that several of those states
most active in international business transactions are among the
enacting jurisdictions. Nonetheless, the failure to obtain passage
by a greater number of states detracts from the effectiveness of
the Act. And, even in the enacting states, confusion remains in
the area of recognition practice, as the above analysis of the case
law demonstrates.
148. 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (Ct. Spec. App. 1978), aff'd 285 Md. 173,
401 A.2d 479 (1979).
149. Id. at 176, 389 A.2d at 418.
150. Id. at 177-84, 389 A.2d at 418-22.
151. But see Nardi v. Segal, 90 Il1. App. 2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805 (App. Ct.
1967).
152. Supra note 24, at 152.
153. See, e.g., Carl, Proposed Legislation: Uniform Foreign Country Judgments Recognition Act, 40 TEx. B.J. 40 (1977), explaining its terms and recommending passage of the Act. Texas has yet to adopt the legislation.
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Arguments in favor of adopting the Act were first cogently set
forth by Professor Kulzer in her study undertaken prior to enactment of the Uniform Act in New York. The primary reason for
adopting the Act was that notification to civil law countries that
their judgments would be recognized in the United States would
result in United States judgments receiving improved treatment
abroad. 154 As the prevailing law would be set forth, foreign nations could more accurately predict the sections of United States
recognition decisions. 15 5 Uniform legislation would also help ease
the way for treaties in this area. 156 Additionally, the Act would
clarify the applicable standards for 5 ' courts in states that had
adopted the Act.
How effective has the Uniform Act been to date? The scope of
this Note does not extend to an examination of those cases in
which United States judgment-holders sought recognition abroad.
A study of these cases would do much to answer the question
posed. But even absent this data, some conclusions can be drawn.
First, the smaller number of states that have adopted the Uniform Act has probably affected the civil law countries' reaction to
it. Many of them are unfamiliar with the machinations of the
United States federal system, and the fact that all states will not
treat their judgments in like fashion may simply lead to a conclusion that reciprocity has not been established. Furthermore, if a
foreign nation were to attempt to unravel the case law in existence under the Act, it would find inconsistent explanations for
the sometimes contradictory actions taken. A greater measure of
consistency and certainty will undoubtedly be achieved as more
cases are decided and courts familiarize themselves with the Act.
The present state of recognition practice in the United States,
however, notwithstanding the Uniform Act, is unsettled. 15 8

154. Kulzer, supra note 14, at 5.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Several other efforts to improve international recognition practice have
been or are currently underway. For an excellent discussion of several draft conventions on this subject, see Zaphiriou, TransnationalRecognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 53 NoTm DAm LAW 734 (1978). See also Draft Con-

vention on the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments in Civil Matters between
the United Kingdom and the United States of America, 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 71
(1977); Brussels Convention of Sept. 27, 1968, on Jurisdiction and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 299) 32
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The recognition of foreign judgments has become increasingly
important as the international marketplace expands. The decision to recognize or to deny recognition to a foreign judgment
arising out of an international business transaction may impact
substantially on United States foreign relations, and therefore
must be considered an important federal concern appropriate for
federal control. 159 The federal government clearly has the power
to enact statutes or enter into treaties governing recognition practice. 160 Judicial action is also a practical possibility. Specifically,
the Supreme Court could, pursuant to the foreign affairs power
and the foreign commerce clause, create a federal common law of
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments."' This proposal merits consideration simply because the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is an area that significantly affects our foreign affairs. Such an area of national concern should
not continue to develop in an ad hoc fashion. Some state and federal courts have expressly rejected the Supreme Court's decision
in Hilton, which is still good law, while other states have yet to
consider the question of which law governs recognition practice in
their state. The ad hoc nature of decision-making in this area is a
direct result of the strong preference of many states to ignore the
Hilton reciprocity rule. To include a reciprocity requirement in
the state's rules on foreign judgments imposes a significant burden on commerce which is undesirable. Assuming reciprocity to
be an undesirable policy in recognition cases, however, individual
state action is a poor way to combat the problem, because it jeopardizes stability in international transactions. Until a coherent
(1977), reprintedin 2 CoMM. MET. REP. (CCH) 6003; Draft Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial

Matters, 5 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 636 (1967).
159. Cheatham & Maier, supra note 12, at 67.
160. Several commentators advocate bilateral and multilateral treaties and
conventions as the best solution to recognition practice problems. See Golomb,
supra note 4, at 642-48; von Mehren & Patterson, supra note 8, at 79-82.
161. On the foreign affairs power, see Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DuKE L.J. 248. On the foreign commerce clause, see Note, Alternative Theories for Establishinga Federal Common Law of ForeignJudgments in
Commercial Cases: The Foreign Affairs Power and the Dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 635 (1976). Indeed, to one commentator, the
Hilton court sought to "federalize" the common law of recognition of foreign
judgments, including the reciprocity requirement. Homburger, supra note-10, at
383-85.
162. Golomb, supra note 4, at 635.
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policy on recognition practice is developed, the potential for disruption of commerce and interference with foreign policy will remain. For these reasons, the Supreme Court should end the confusion as to which law governs in recognition cases by over-ruling
Hilton v. Guyot. The Court could then begin to fashion a federal
common law of recognition practice with the rules of the Uniform
Act as its cornerstone. By incorporating the Uniform Act into a
federal common law of recognition practice, the national uniformity necessary to deal with the problems associated with recognition practice will be obtained in the most expeditious manner
possible. As long as the Hilton reciprocity rule remains good law,
the Uniform Act in its present form cannot achieve a uniform and
coherent United States recognition policy.
Carol C. Honigberg

